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A rbitration
Can an Arbitrator Be Given the Authority to Decide Whether
an Agreement to Arbitrate Is Enforceable?
CASE AT A GLANCE
Antonio Jackson, an employee of Rent-A-Center, West, Inc., brought a lawsuit against Rent-A-Center
alleging race discrimination and retaliation. When Rent-A-Center asserted that the action was subject to an
arbitration agreement, Jackson argued that the court and not the arbitrator should determine whether the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable.

Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson
Docket No. 09-497
Argument Date: April 26, 2010
From: The Ninth Circuit
by Jay E. Grenig
Marquette University Law School

ISSUE
Must a district court rather than an arbitrator decide claims that an
arbitration agreement is unconscionable even though the parties assigned this “gateway” issue to the arbitrator for decision?

FACTS
Respondent Antonio Jackson was an employee of Rent-A-Center West,
Inc. On February 1, 2007, he filed a complaint in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada alleging race discrimination and
retaliation by Rent-A-Center in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Rent-ACenter moved to dismiss the court proceedings and compel arbitration. Rent-A-Center relied on a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims
that Jackson had signed as a condition of his employment when he
was initially hired. The agreement specifically includes claims for discrimination in the list of claims that must be resolved by arbitration.
The Agreement also states:
The Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or
agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute
relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability
or formation of this Agreement including, but not limited
to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or
voidable.
Rent-A-Center argued that, in light of this provision, the threshold
question of whether the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable was for an arbitrator, not the court, to decide. In response, Jackson argued that the agreement was unconscionable—that is, that it
was so unfair that a court must, in good conscious, refuse to enforce
it. In particular, he contended that the agreement was substantively
unconscionable because it contained one-sided coverage and discovery provisions and a provision specifying that the arbitrator’s fee
was to be equally shared by the parties. Jackson also argued the
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agreement was procedurally unconscionable because the form
contract was presented to him as a nonnegotiable condition of his
employment.
The district court granted Rent-A-Center’s motion to dismiss the
judicial proceedings and to compel arbitration. The court found that
the agreement to arbitrate “clearly and unmistakably provides the arbitrator with the exclusive authority to decide whether the agreement
to arbitrate is enforceable.” The district court held that “the question
of arbitrability is for the arbitrator.” The district court also held that
even if it were to reach the merits of Jackson’s assertion that the
agreement was unconscionable, Jackson had not demonstrated that
the agreement was substantively unconscionable.
Jackson appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Rent-A-Center once again argued that the validity of the agreement to
arbitrate must be determined by an arbitrator in accordance with the
terms of the agreement. Jackson did not dispute that the language of
the agreement clearly assigns the arbitrability determination to the
arbitrator. He did dispute that he meaningfully agreed to the terms
of the form agreement, which he contended was procedurally and
substantively unconscionable.
In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit held that when a party specifically challenges arbitration provisions as unconscionable and hence
invalid, whether the arbitration provisions are unconscionable is
an issue for the court to determine by applying the relevant state
contract law principles. 581 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2009). The court said
this rule applies even if the agreement’s express terms delegate that
determination to the arbitrator.
The Supreme Court granted Rent-A-Center’s petition for review. 130
S. Ct. 1133 (2010).
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

CASE ANALYSIS
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that agreements to
arbitrate disputes “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. While the FAA expresses a “liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements,” Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala.
v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted),
federal law “directs courts to place arbitration agreements on equal
footing with other contracts.” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S.
279, 293, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002). In Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985), the
court said that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”
Pointing out that the FAA’s primary purpose is to enforce arbitration
agreements in accordance with their terms, Rent-A-Center notes that
Congress enacted the FAA to overcome historic judicial hostility to
arbitration and replace that hostility with a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements. Rent-A-Center argues that courts must
enforce agreements to arbitrate in the manner provided for in the
parties’ agreement. Where the parties clearly and unmistakably agree
to delegate the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator, their agreement
must be honored. According to Rent-A-Center, the Ninth Circuit disregarded these principles in refusing to enforce the parties’ agreement,
on a mere assertion of unconscionability, even though the agreement
clearly and unmistakably referred the issue of contract enforceability
to the arbitrator in the first instance.

arbitration, Rent-A-Center concludes, is to provide a different forum
for resolving the same substantive issues that courts decide.
Jackson responds that Rent-A-Center’s approach would prevent the
courts from fulfilling their fundamental, statutorily required and
time-honored role of ensuring that every arbitration clause they
enforce meets the requirements of Section 2 of the FAA. To evade
judicial scrutiny, a drafter could simply insert a provision stating that
challenges to the arbitration clause’s validity are to be decided by the
arbitrator, not the court.
Jackson further argues that, under Rent-A-Center’s theory, the sole
criteria for judging the validity of such a clause would be its language.
He claims this would mean an arbitration clause must be enforced
even if it was signed under duress. All that would matter would be
that the clause be “clear and unmistakable.” It is Jackson’s position
that this approach not only does violence to the FAA but also runs
afoul of the Supreme Court’s repeated teachings that determinations
of the validity and enforceability of an arbitration clause (as opposed
to the contract as a whole) are for the court to decide, not the arbitrator. Jackson declares that an arbitration agreement cannot stop a
court from deciding whether the agreement is even valid.
In sum, Rent-A-Center concludes there is no dispute that (1) Jackson
signed the Arbitration Agreement, (2) it covers his claims for relief,
(3) it refers the issue of unconscionability to the arbitrator, and (4)
it does so in clear and unmistakable language. Accordingly, RentA-Center asserts the Ninth Circuit erred in refusing to enforce the
agreement in accordance with its terms, as required by the FAA.

Rent-A-Center asserts that courts must decide whether the parties
objectively revealed their intent to submit the arbitrability issue to the
arbitrator. If the parties in fact were crystalline in expressing their
intention to have enforceability issues decided by the arbitrator, RentA-Center contends the courts should respect that judgment; otherwise, those statements of intent are meaningless and the numerous
arbitration agreements that have been entered into in reliance on
them have been rendered equally meaningless.

Jackson, however, concludes that if Rent-A-Center were to succeed,
there would be nothing to stop stronger parties from inserting similar
language into other arbitration clauses that routinely appear in employment and consumer contracts. The result would be the wholesale
elimination of the courts’ role in ensuring that arbitration clauses are
valid and enforceable before enforcing them—a result that could not
help but erode the public’s faith in the legitimacy and integrity of arbitration as a fair and just alternative dispute resolution mechanism.

Jackson, however, argues that the FAA requires enforcement only of
arbitration agreements that are valid under state law applicable to all
contracts. Jackson claims the Supreme Court has rejected the proposition that there are no limits to what parties can agree to under the
FAA. He contends the Court has emphatically held that parties cannot
“contract out” of the important protections embedded in the text of
the FAA, and that courts will not enforce provisions of arbitration
agreements that are at odds with the textual features of the FAA.

Moreover, even if the Supreme Court were to determine that parties
may “contract around” the FAA’s requirement that a court ensure the
validity of an arbitration clause before enforcing it, Jackson asserts
that Rent-A-Center has failed to demonstrate that its delegation
clause complies with ordinary state-law principles governing contract
construction or that there is clear and unmistakable evidence that the
parties agreed to delegate the threshold question of the arbitration
clause’s validity to the arbitrator.

According to Rent-A Center, the argument that arbitrators cannot be
trusted to rule on the validity of a contract to arbitrate runs contrary
to the FAA’s rejection of the presumption of arbitral bias, which had
enflamed judicial hostility to arbitration prior to the act’s passage.

SIGNIFICANCE

Rent-A-Center notes that Congress has been completely comfortable
allowing arbitrators to resolve issues concerning the enforcement
of fundamental antidiscrimination statutes. It contends there is no
reason to believe that an arbitrator would be less capable of deciding
whether the contract was unconscionable than whether Jackson was
the victim of race discrimination or retaliation. The whole point of
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

The Supreme Court has determined that “arbitration is a matter of
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” Howsam v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002). Thus when deciding
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including
arbitrability), courts generally should apply the ordinary state-law
principles that govern the formation of contracts. Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties had
agreed to arbitrate that dispute, so the question of “who has the
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primary power to decide arbitrability” turns upon what the parties
agreed about that matter.
The Supreme Court has held that, as a matter of federal substantive
arbitration law, when a party challenges the validity of a contract between the parties, but “not specifically its arbitration provisions,” the
challenge to the contract’s validity should be considered by an arbitrator, not a court. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440
(2006). When, however, a party specifically challenges the validity of
the arbitration provisions within a larger contract and apart from the
validity of the contract as a whole, a court decides the threshold question of the enforceability of the arbitration provisions.
The rationale behind a rule requiring courts to make the threshold
determination when the challenge specifically targets the validity of
arbitration provisions is that arbitration is itself a matter of contract.
“The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory
submission to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that
the … agreement does in fact create such a duty.” John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964). A court may not compel
arbitration until it is “satisfied that the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue.” 9 U.S.C.
§ 4. In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995),
the Court stated that “[c]ourts should not assume that the parties
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is [clear and unmistakable] evidence that they did so.”
If Rent-A-Center prevails, therefore, the process of submitting a case
to arbitration will be streamlined—reducing the role of the judiciary
in determining whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable
before deciding whether to compel arbitration. If Jackson prevails,
employees and consumers will be encouraged to seek judicial review
of arbitration agreements that they believe unconscionable.
Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law at Marquette University Law School
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Professor Grenig is the author of Alternative Dispute Resolution published by ThomsonReuters/West. He is a
member of the National Academy of Arbitrators. He can be reached at
jgrenig@earthlink.net or 414.288.5377.
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